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In bed with South-East Asia's largest terrorist organisationIn bed with South-East Asia's largest terrorist organisationAustralia is intimately involved with the Indonesian military. The Australian Defence Force trains the Indonesian military and Australian arms manufacturers arm the Indonesian military. The Indonesian military's links with terrorist groups in Indonesia
The Indonesian military has close links with Jeemah Islamiyah, suspected by many as being behind the Bali bombing. Laskar Jihad (Holy Warriors), a group within the JI network enjoys the protection and support of the Indonesian military. In recent years they have established themselves in West Papua. The Indonesian military provides training and weapons to Laskar Jihad as well as opportunities to participate in legal and illegal business activities. Perhaps the most notorious group in Indonesia who routinely uses violence to achieve political ends is Kopassus, the Indonesian Special Forces. Kopassus was the group who armed, trained and organised militias in East Timor. The same group who murdered the West Papuan independence leader, Theys Eluay in November 2001. The Indonesian military, including Kopassus has also been accused by the West Papuan human rights group, Elsham, of killing 3 teachers from the giant Freeport mine in the bid to extort money. The Indonesian military has waged war and sowed terror across the archipelago. It is the major source of insecurity for all Indonesians from Aceh to West Papua. In the case of West Papua, no-one knows for sure how many have died during the last forty years but killings have been on such a scale as to threaten the very survival of the West Papuan people. Far from helping stop violence and terrorism, foreign support for the Indonesian military only makes them more effective, efficient and professional human rights abusers.
There is also a direct link between savage capitalism and militarism. Corporate exploitation in West Papua is directly facilitated by militarism. Resource extraction industries are a lucrative source of income for the Indonesian military (also known as the TNI). According to academic activist Lesley McCulloch and retired Australian Army officer, Robert Lowry, the Indonesian military only receives 20%-30% of its operating budget from the state. The remainder is made up from legal and illegal business activity. The hand-in-glove relationship between global capital and the TNI is characterised by shared interest and mutual dependency. If multinationals resist the TNIs involvement in places like West Papua, the military seeks to extort money and/or engineer incidents that create the pretext for them providing a security presence with the aim of leveraging greater economic advantage. Consequently, many corporate elites feel that they have to engage the military to protect business interests, whilst the TNI view multinational investment as a legitimate source of personal income and institutional financial support. In fact, the distinguished outspoken Indonesian academic, George Aditjondro, who has spent many years studying the financial interests of the Indonesian military, argues that it is impossible for any company to do business in Indonesia without some links to either the police or the military. This is certainly the case with the gold and copper mine, Freeport. Megawati Sukarnoputris civilian Defence minister, Juwono Sudarsono, recently conceded that the military incited unrest at Freeport to highlight the benefits of their presence. The local commander requested and received payments considered necessary for operational costs. As a result, Freeport/Rio-Tinto paid the TNI a one off payment of U.S $35 million and pledged annual contributions of U.S $11 million.
Although the support the Australian government provides to the TNI is extremely small when compared with that of the United States or Britain, it is an extremely significant part of a policy framework that helps legitimise the TNI, strengthens the culture of impunity surrounding the TNI, and helps create a stabile climate seen by the market as conducive for foreign investment, even though that stability sits on top of a social volcano. Campaigns to alter the will and undermine the power of those who support Australias military relationship with the TNI will help strengthen the hand of those in Indonesia and West Papua working to end human rights abuses by the military, end impunity and return the military to the barracks.
Australia arms the TNI, although what is supplied and who supplies is concealed by commercial in confidence agreements. What is known from Department of Defence documents is that in 1999/2000 Australia sent 14 shipments of military aid - weapons, ammunition and military equipment and 207 shipments of dual-use goods (goods that can be used for both military and civilian purposes) to Indonesia. In 2000/2001 Australia sent 11 shipments of weapons, ammunition and military equipment and 143 shipments of dual-use goods to Indonesia. The Australian government also supplies Nomad surveillance aircraft to the TNI. As recently as this year Nomad aircraft were used in military operations in West Papua. Nomads are also used to monitor the maritime border between Australia and Indonesia, effectively subcontracting the TNI as bouncers to keep out refugees. In addition the Australian government agency, the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation, also provides loans to the Indonesian government for military equipment. For example during the 1998-1999 financial year the EFIC loaned the Indonesian government US $5.1 million dollars to help buy equipment and services for military transport aircraft. Whilst 'commercial in confidence' agreements maintain the veil of secrecy surrounding arms deals, major Australian and Australian based arms companies include Australian Defence Industries (ADI), Tennix and SMA (Scientific Management Associates). These arms companies depend on workers and union members. Ironically, weapons, ammunition and military equipment made by workers in Australia could well be used to repress workers in Indonesia, where the TNI and Indonesian police systematically use violence and intimidation against labour organisers and people resisting the social and environmental impacts of local and multinational corporations. The principal union for workers at ADI plants around the country is the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU). The MUA (Maritime Union of Australia) is also responsible for loading many of the shipments destined for export. It is not unrealistic to envisage unions supporting action to halt military aid to Indonesia. After all they were at the forefront of action in support of East Timor. The MUA has a long and glorious history of international solidarity and has supported liberation struggles within Indonesia without fear or favour. The AMWU was one of eleven unions who signed a memorandum of understanding with West Papuan independence leaders, Jacob Rumbiak and Rev. Dr. Martin Luther Wanma in September, 2000. 'The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding is to express solidarity with the aspirations of the West Papuan people...' The first point of the memorandum expresses union concern about human rights abuses committed by the TNI. Although the United States is the principal provider of military training to the TNI, the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) are an important provider of training to the Indonesian military. For over ten years Australia trained members of the TNI who organised militia violence in East Timor. Australia then went into East Timor to protect ordinary East Timorese from the very people we had trained. Despite the popular impression that Australia ceased to arm and train the Indonesian military after the Indonesian military and militia orchestrated violence in East Timor in September 1999, according to the Defence Minister 'Australia maintained defence relations with TNI. At no time was the relationship severed. ADF and TNI personnel remained in each others country throughout the crisis period.' It is instructive to remember that years of training the Indonesian military may have limited military engagements between the Australian and Indonesian Defence Forces in East Timor in 1999, but it did nothing to reduce violence against the East Timorese by the TNI and prevent the torching of East Timor during an orgy of post-ballot destruction in September 1999. Defence cooperation between Australia and Indonesia may have stopped Indonesian boys killing white Australian boys but it certainly did nothing to stop the Indonesian military slaughtering East Timorese and razing the country to the ground. In the end, ADF personnel were sent to East Timor to protect ordinary East Timorese from the very people Australia had armed and trained. In the 1999 to 2000 financial year Australia trained 56 members of the Indonesian military. During 2000 to 2001 this figure increased to 72. (Later figures are not yet available). These soldiers were trained at bases around Australia and given Australian government scholarships to study at Australian universities. Between 1999 and 2001 the total cost to the Australian taxpayer was over $10 million dollars. Since the Bali bombing the Australian Government has also advocated resuming combat training with Kopassus. The arming and training (including non-combat training) of the Indonesian military by Australia not only assists the Indonesian military to maintain the occupation in West Papua, it also creates the illusion that the Indonesian military resolves conflict, when in reality, it is a major cause of conflict.
Since Australia's peacekeeping operation in East Timor, however, ADF personnel, have become increasing politicised. As a result, not only could the ADF be influenced by external public dissent about defence-related activities with the TNI, the ADF is also subject to internal dissent within the military and defence department. One strategic goal for those who support greater debate about the Australian governments relationship with the TNI is to help create and widen spaces for internal dissent within the ADF and defence department. This will help undermine the power of the ADF and the Australian government to support TNI repression, not just in West Papua but also throughout the Indonesian archipelago. Dissent within the armed forces is more widespread than is popularly believed. In 1999 top-secret intelligence information was leaked to sympathetic supporters when it became clear the government was not taking into consideration information that clearly showed the TNI were responsible for militia violence in East Timor but was instead pursuing their own agenda and interests. This dissent has continued. Disappointed that information has still not been shared with United Nations staff investigating serious crimes in East Timor, Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) officers recently exposed the cover-up by leaking documents to The Age. Amongst many ADF personnel, one officer says half-jokingly, TNI stands for 'Trust No Indonesian'. The previously staunch apologist for Suharto, former minister for foreign affairs, Gareth Evans, who once claimed that the invasion of East Timor was 'irreversible' now admits (to his credit) that 'many of our earlier training efforts helped only to produce more professional human rights abusers.' Investing in violence and ecological destruction |